As the thrust of his substantive claim, the Claimant alleges that he was convicted of an offence with which he was not charged: he was charged with "common assault", but convicted of "assault by beating". He relies on cases such as Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner  1 QB 439; (1968) 52 Cr App R 700, R v Lynsey  3 All ER 654 and R (Kracher) v Leicester Magistrates' Court  EWHC 4627 (Admin), which, he submits, make clear that section 39 of the 1988 Act provides for two discrete, mutually exclusive offences, namely (i) common assault by fear of immediate violence and (ii) battery; and, he says, those cases emphasise the importance of making clear the basis of the prosecution case which the defendant has to meet. He denies that the charge was amended in his presence on 13 February 2018, as the court record indicates.
However, even if the charge had not been amended thus and it had remained as a charge of just "common assault", as I have explained, that general description would have incorporated the more specific "battery" or "assault by beating". We have not seen the evidence; but there is nothing to suppose that, as is usual, the initial charge of assault involved an allegation, supported by the evidence, that the Claimant had used unlawful force on the complainant. The conviction of "assault by beating" would therefore have been open to the magistrates, in any event; and the Claimant did not suffer any possible prejudice or unfairness. He says that he did not know the particulars of the offence against him, but it could be safely assumed from the charge that he was being charged with actually using unlawful force. In any event, there is no evidence that the preparation of his defence would have materially altered if he had known that the allegation against him had been confirmed as actual violence or merely the threat of imminent violence; for example, because there was some point of law or issue of fact that he would have investigated or pursued that he did not in fact investigate or pursue, or he would have attended or been represented at his trial.