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A free weekly collection of criminal law links - for practitioners, law students, and anyone with an interest in the criminal justice system of England and Wales.
Curated by Sam Willis, a barrister at 5 King's Bench Walk.
News
'New laws to clamp down on disruptive protesters come into force'
New public order powers to prevent individuals causing repeated serious disruption come into force today, as the government continues with its plan to protect the public from criminality at protests. Serious Disruption Prevention Orders will empower the police to intervene before individuals cause serious disruption, for those who have previously committed protest-related offences or ignored court-imposed restrictions.
The new orders can impose a range of restraints on an individual, including preventing them from being in a particular place or area, participating in disruptive activities and being with protest groups at given times. They can also stop individuals from using the internet to encourage protest-related offences. These orders can be imposed on those who have, on at least 2 occasions, committed protest-related offences, for example locking-on, or breached the conditions of an injunction. The specific restrictions contained within each order will be decided by the court and can last up to 2 years. They can also be renewed if the person remains a threat. Serious Disruption Prevention Orders were introduced as part of the Public Order Act 2023, which was passed last year, and are court orders. Breaching an order will be a criminal offence and will carry a maximum penalty of 6 months in prison and/or an unlimited fine...
'Sentencing pregnant women and new mothers'
From 1 April 2024, the Council is including a new, dedicated mitigating factor: ‘Pregnancy, childbirth and post-natal care’, in the majority of offence specific sentencing guidelines, providing guidance for courts on sentencing pregnant offenders and new mothers. Consideration of pregnancy in sentencing was previously part of the ‘Sole or primary carer’ mitigating factor, which set out that, when sentencing a pregnant offender, relevant considerations may include any effect of the sentence on the health of the offender and on the unborn child...
Sentencing involves consideration of both the seriousness of the offence, including the impact on victims, and the circumstances of the offender. The impact of custody on an offender who is pregnant or post-natal can be harmful for both the offender and the child, including by separation, especially in the first two years of life. Women in custody are likely to have complex health needs, which may increase the risks associated with pregnancy for both mother and child. The NHS classifies all pregnancies in prison as high risk. There may be difficulties accessing medical assistance or specialist maternity services in custody, and access to a place in a prison mother-and-baby unit is not automatic. The factor is particularly relevant where an offender is on the cusp of custody or where the suitability of a community order is being considered. Sentencers will also look at the Imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline...
'Deprived background Sentencing Council guidelines come into force'
New sentencing guidelines have come into force this week, despite a ‘predominately negative’ response from judges and magistrates when they were proposed. The guidelines introduced a new mitigating factor which courts should consider when sentencing offenders: judges and magistrates should now take account of the ‘difficult and/or deprived background or personal circumstances’ of offenders. Such disadvantages include but are not limited to: experience of discrimination; negative experiences of authority; early experience of loss, neglect or abuse; negative influences from peers; low educational attainment; insecure housing; mental health difficulties; poverty and being a direct or indirect victim of domestic abuse...
Respondents had ‘a general feeling that a new mitigating factor was not necessary as sentencers took these matters into account already’, the Sentencing Council wrote in a report on the consultation to the proposed amendments, published in September. But the minority who shared positive views on the factor suggested it was useful and liked the way it clearly listed what to consider, it added. Following the consultation, the Sentencing Council did make a change, which was to clarify one disadvantage which had read ‘misuse of drugs and/or alcohol’. Some magistrates felt the reference to misuse of drugs or alcohol conflicted with the aggravating factor ‘commission of offence under the influence of alcohol or drugs’. The disadvantage on the final guidelines reads ‘difficulties relating to the misuse of drugs and or alcohol (but note: being voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the offence is an aggravating factor)’.
'Post Office Horizon Inquiry to restart with solicitors and barristers featuring heavily in the list of witnesses'
Public hearings of the Post Office Inquiry begin again next week – with nine solicitors set to give oral evidence in the coming two months. The inquiry moves onto the final elements of the Post Office scandal, examining in detail the issues of governance, redress and how the organisation and others responded as it emerged that hundreds of prosecutions of sub-postmasters may not have been safe... Hearings will finish in July when the inquiry will hear from former government ministers whose portfolios included the Post Office. In between, more than a dozen lawyers will give evidence about the role they played in advising the Post Office up to and including the Bates litigation which finally blew open the Horizon IT scandal...
'Additional court capacity in London'
To provide ongoing additional court capacity in London, we are extending the use of Barbican Nightingale court, which houses two Crown Court rooms, until August 2025. We have also started a project to convert existing space at Southwark Crown Court into an additional courtroom, enabling further movement of work across London...
'First person in England sentenced for keeping illegal XL Bully under new laws'
A dog owner has become the first to be sentenced for illegally possessing an XL Bully dog in breach of new laws. Patrick McKeown, 40, is the first known person to be prosecuted under the laws which came into force on 1 February. McKeown failed to apply for an exemption for his XL Bully, and also did not neuter the dog or obtain insurance. It was reported that the dog was also seen loose in the backyard of the property in Worthing, West Sussex, police said. McKeown warned officers his dog would attack anyone who approached it. Officers executed a warrant at the address and the dog was seized. The former builder admitted one count of possessing or having a fighting dog, contrary to the Dangerous Dogs Act, at Worthing Magistrates’ Court on March 12...
'Interest rate rigging appeal must go to top court, say politicians'
Two former bankers jailed for rigging interest rates must have their appeal heard by the Supreme Court, senior politicians have said. Tom Hayes and Carlo Palombo were among 37 City traders prosecuted for rigging rate benchmarks Libor and Euribor. They got out of prison in 2021 and the Court of Appeal dismissed a bid to overturn their convictions last week.
Conservative Sir David Davis and Labour's John McDonnell have said they believe the ruling was unfair. Former Lord Chancellor Lord Mackay of Clashfern has also told the BBC he was "deeply concerned" about the basis on which the men were convicted. Mr Hayes and Mr Palombo have said they will apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to take their cases to the Supreme Court. The former traders were found guilty of manipulating Libor and Euribor, two benchmark interest rates that track what banks pay to borrow cash from each other...
Cases
R v Reid [2024] EWCA Crim 308
On 20th December 2021, following a trial in the Crown Court at Norwich before Her Honour Judge Bacon KC and a jury, the applicant was convicted of an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment...
We begin by considering the circumstances and consequences of the applicant's decision to dispense with trial counsel. A defendant who makes such a decision in the course of a trial may well find that he is required thereafter to represent himself; but we see at least three substantial problems about the way in which the issue was dealt with in this trial. First, we think it unfortunate that the applicant was very quickly required to make a stark choice between representation by counsel in whom he said he had lost confidence, and representing himself. That was coupled, as we have noted, with a warning by the judge that she would not permit the applicant to disrupt the trial – a warning for which, in our view, there was at that stage no justification. The applicant was given no chance to say whether he wished to be represented by different counsel, as in fact he did. Secondly, the judge adopted a similarly peremptory approach when she was told that the solicitors would be able to instruct fresh counsel and resume proceedings the following day. The judge immediately accepted the suggestion of the prosecution that there would inevitably be an application to start the trial anew, and that any such application would inevitably be granted. There appears to have been no reconsideration of that decision when the subsequent email from the solicitors indicated that they only sought an adjournment until the following morning. Nor does there appear to have been any opportunity for the applicant to make submissions as to whether the interests of justice required that the trial should start again. Thirdly, and most importantly, the judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that the applicant was still represented by solicitors and was entitled to be advised by them. The judge, at a very early stage, enquired whether the applicant had been able to speak to his solicitors on the phone and was told that he had. But nothing more was done. No steps had been taken by the judge to discharge the representation order, even if, which we doubt, it could be said that grounds for doing so had arisen. The solicitors remained on the record until 17th December, by which time a number of important rulings had been made. It does not appear that the applicant was ever told in terms that he was entitled to seek the advice of his solicitors. Nor was any attempt made by the judge to require a representative of the solicitors to attend the hearing so that he or she could advise the applicant...
... Miss Oborne has raised a number of other points. But we have said enough to explain the principal reasons for our concluding that the applicant did not receive a fair trial. Whatever rulings might have been made, if all matters had been considered and addressed as they should have been, it is impossible to regard this conviction as safe...